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Abstract 1 
Research has shown that false memory production is enhanced for material that 2 
is emotionally congruent with the mood of the participant at the time of encoding. So far 3 
this research has only examined the influence of generic negative affective mood states 4 
and generic negative stimuli on false memory production. In addition, much of the 5 
research is limited as it focuses on valence and arousal dimensions, and fails to take into 6 
account the more comprehensive nature of emotions. The current study demonstrates 7 
that this effect goes beyond general negative or positive moods and acts at a more 8 
discrete emotional level. Participants underwent a standard emotion induction 9 
procedure before listening to negative emotional or neutral associative word lists. The 10 
emotions induced, negative word lists and associated non-presented critical lures, were 11 
related to either fear or anger, two negative valence emotions that are also both high in 12 
arousal. Results showed that when valence and arousal are controlled for, false 13 
memories are more likely to be produced for discrete emotionally congruent compared 14 
to incongruent materials.  These results support spreading activation theories of false 15 
remembering and add to our understanding of the adaptive nature of false memory 16 
production. 17 
 18 
 19 
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Discrete emotion-congruent false memories in the DRM paradigm 23 
 24 
Memory is not infallible. Often entire events or specific details of an event are 25 
falsely remembered.  These false memories can have very detrimental effects.  For 26 
example, Howe and Malone (2011) recently warned clinical practitioners not only to be 27 
aware of the presence of false memories during discussions in therapy, but also of the 28 
possibility of inducing new false memories.  In their paper the authors demonstrate an 29 
increased production in depression relevant false memories within the group of 30 
participants with major depressive disorder compared to participants without the 31 
disorder.  This finding raises an interesting question of whether this congruency effect is 32 
also present within typical everyday emotional experiences. 33 
There is some literature on mood congruency and false memories.  However, 34 
this branch of research is still in its infancy.  Ruci, Tomes, and Zelenski (2009) 35 
investigated the effect of positive and negative valence on spontaneous false memory 36 
production for positive, negative, and neutral stimuli.  The authors predicted that 37 
manipulating both the mood of participants and the emotion of the material would 38 
induce a mood congruence effect in memory.  The recognition results supported this 39 
prediction.  That is, false memory production was enhanced for emotional material that 40 
matched the emotional state of the participant at encoding.  This finding has been 41 
replicated by Knott and Thorley (2013) and these authors also showed that mood 42 
congruence effects persisted over a one week delay.   43 
Although informative, the focus of these studies has been solely on differences in 44 
valence, other research has shown that the level of arousal associated with emotions is 45 
another important factor that affects memory.  In fact, valence and arousal have been 46 
shown to have very different effects on false memories.  Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, 47 
and Toglia (2010) measured the effects of arousal and valence when varied orthogonally 48 
across materials.  False memory rates were found to be higher for low valence and high 49 
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arousal, however the effects of arousal were only present for negatively valenced 50 
material (see also Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010;  Mickley Steinmetz, 51 
Addis, & Kensinger, 2010).  In contrast, Corson and Verrier (2007) examined the effects 52 
of arousal and valence on false memory by inducing a range of discrete emotional states.  53 
A temporary mood induction technique was used to induce happiness, serenity, anger, 54 
and sadness; chosen to give distinctions between high and low arousal, and positive and 55 
negative valence.  False memories were measured for neutral stimuli and the results 56 
revealed that high arousal led to more false memories, but there was no effect for 57 
valence.  The authors concluded that higher arousal increased confidence leading to an 58 
increase in the number of false memories being reported.  This research goes to 59 
furthering our understanding of how arousal and valence affect false memory 60 
production, however it fails to address any other dimensions of emotion that may also 61 
have an effect on false memory production.  62 
In a review of the emotion and memory research literature, Levine and Pizarro 63 
(2004) argued that it made little sense to limit research to the effects of emotional 64 
arousal on memory.  That is, people may feel elated, terrified, despairing, or furious – 65 but they are never just ǲarousedǳ.  Levine and Pizarro highlight the fact that specific 66 
emotions are likely adaptive in nature, allowing us to respond appropriately to changes 67 
in our environment.  Emotions are led by appraisals and these appraisals serve an 68 
adaptive purpose by helping people evaluate their environment based on their specific 69 
goals and guide appropriate action (Frijda, 1988; Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 70 
2013).  This aspect of emotion cannot be explained in terms of arousal and valence and 71 
therefore for a complete understanding of the effects of emotion on false memory we 72 
need to look beyond the effects of arousal and valence. 73 
In an attempt to highlight the limitation of focussing on valence effects Lerner 74 
and Keltner (2000) looked at the effect of fear and anger, two emotions of similar 75 
valence, on risk perception.  Fear led to more pessimistic decision making while anger 76 
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led to more optimistic judgements.  The results support appraisal theories of emotion 77 
and highlight the need to look beyond emotion effects driven by valence.  Fear and anger 78 
have also been used to demonstrate the effect of discrete emotion on memory, 79 
regardless of arousal and valence.  In an investigation of emotional arousal and negative 80 
affect on memory for peripheral and central details, Talarico, Berntsen, and Rubin 81 
(2009) found that although negative affect impaired recall of peripheral details, there 82 
were distinct differences in the results for fear and anger.  Talarico et al. took a measure 83 
of reliving at retrieval and found that this was negatively correlated with peripheral 84 
recall for anger but not fear, regardless of the similarities in dimensions between these 85 
two emotions.   86 
The role of specific emotions, irrespective of arousal and valence effect, on false 87 
memories has yet to be studied.  However, research has recently shown how important 88 
specific emotional states may be in false memory.  Although caution is appropriate when 89 
generalising from psychopathology to everyday emotional experiences, in a study 90 
mentioned earlier, Howe and Malone (2011) showed specific emotion congruent effects 91 
for false memories in individuals diagnosed with a major depressive disorder (see also 92 
Moritz, Gläscher, & Brassen, 2005).  Based on these findings it is important to examine 93 
whether specific emotions have a distinct effect on the way people attend to, encode, 94 
and retrieve false information that may or may not be congruent to the experienced 95 
emotion.  To do this we aim to expand up on the work of Ruci et al. (2009)  and Knott 96 
and Thorley (2013), by manipulating fear and anger, to investigate whether there is a 97 
discrete emotion-congruency effect with spontaneous false memories.  Fear and anger 98 
are dimensionally similar with regards to arousal and valence and therefore allow us to 99 
investigate more thoroughly this effect (Russell, 1980). 100 
As with many of the experiments mentioned so far, we measured false memories 101 
using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & 102 
McDermott, 1995).  In the DRM paradigm, participants are presented lists of words (e.g., 103 
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steal, robber, crook…Ȍ that are all semantically related to one non-presented word (e.g., 104 
thief), known as the critical lure. The first word in the list will be the highest associate of 105 
the critical lure and subsequent words are ordered in decreasing associative strength.  106 
When asked to remember the lists participants often falsely remember the critical lure 107 
as being present in the original list. In order to further validate the false memories being 108 
reported, participants are asked to give a remember-know-guess judgement where 109 Ǯrememberǯ measures the presence of a distinctive recollective experience, Ǯknowǯ  110 
measures a sense of familiarity, and Ǯguessǯ measures a level of uncertainty. 111 
According to theories of spreading activation (Bower, 1981; Howe, Wimmer, 112 
Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009) we would expect to see an  increase in the production of 113 
false memories for material that is emotionally congruent to that of the participant. For 114 
example, associative-activation theory (AAT) hypothesizes that knowledge is stored in a 115 
semantic network and when a concept is activated, this activation spreads to other 116 
neighboring concepts.  Once activation reaches a certain threshold the source of this 117 
activation can be misattributed to the original stimulus producing a false memory.  118 
Emotional states contribute to a conceptǯs activation and therefore increase the chances 119 
of reaching this critical threshold, a mechanism that not only accounts for previous 120 
results (e.g., Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 2009) but is also able to predict the same 121 
pattern of congruency effects for discrete emotions.  Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT; Brainerd 122 
& Reyna, 2002) would also predict such results.  FTT theorizes that, as verbatim traces 123 
of memory deteriorate, gist traces are retrieved, ones that lead to false recognition of 124 
associated material.  Congruent mood states are said to increase false memory rates 125 
because reliance on gist traces increases with emotion. 126 
In the present research, we extend previous research on the emotional 127 
congruency effect (Howe & Malone, 2011; Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 2009) by 128 
using discrete emotions that are dimensionally similar with regard to arousal and 129 
valence.  In order to better understand the link between memory and emotion, we need 130 
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to go beyond a simple examination of the effects of emotional arousal and valence and 131 
instead be able to classify to-be-remembered information as emotionally congruent or 132 
incongruent with a specific emotional state (e.g., fear, anger). 133 
 134 
Method 135 
Participants 136 
A total of 83 (25 male and 58 female) A-level students, all aged 18, took part in 137 the experiment, voluntarily.  The experiment was conducted at the participantsǯ school, 138 
with the approval of the teachers.  All participants gave written informed consent and 139 
were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment. 140 
Design 141 
A 3(Emotion: anger vs. fear vs. control) x 3(List: anger, fear, neutral) mixed 142 
design was used, with a standard DRM paradigm and recognition memory test.  Emotion 143 
was the between-participants variable and list type was the within-participant variable. 144 
Recognition responses were taken for target words, filler items, and critical lures, along 145 
with additional judgements of either remember, know, or guess (R/K/G).  Instructions 146 
were based on those from Rajaram (1993).  Participants were randomly assigned to the 147 
anger condition (N = 27), fear condition (N = 28), or control condition (N = 28).   148 
Materials, and Procedure 149 
Participants in the control group underwent no emotion induction procedure.  150 
The two experimental groups, fear and anger, were presented with short film clips from 151 
Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007).  Anger was induced by showing people a clip from 152 the film ǲMy Bodyguardǳ, in which one male was harassing and bullying another.  Fear 153 was induced by showing participants a clip from the movie ǲThe Shiningǳ, in which a 154 
young boy is troubled and playing in a haunted building.   To demonstrate that any 155 
differences in memory were not the result of a temporary mood change at retrieval, all 156 
participants watched a neutral video clip (from a wildlife documentary) lasting 5 157 
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minutes prior to retrieval.  To monitor emotional states throughout the experiment 158 
participants reported levels of valence and arousal through the self-assessment manikin 159 
(SAM) questionnaire. 160 
A total of six 10-item DRM word lists were presented, two of which were related 161 
to fear, two to anger, and two were neutral (see Appendix).  Lists were presented in 162 
emotion consistent pairings and the list orders for the fear and anger groups were 163 
different so that the lists congruent to the participantsǯ emotion always came first.  This 164 
was done to prevent incongruent lists contaminating the emotional state of the 165 
participants at the beginning of encoding.  To ensure this choice of list order was not a 166 
confounding variable, the different list orders were replicated and counterbalanced 167 
within the control group to enable later comparison1.  Lists were created from those 168 
used by Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999) and using The University of South 169 
Florida word association database (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004).  The six critical 170 
lures were anger, war, fear, danger, earth, and hair.  Backward associative strength 171 
(BAS) was controlled across the lists and word frequency for the critical lures was 172 
equated across the negative lists, but was slightly higher for the neutral lists.  Valence 173 
and arousal scores were taken from the Affective norms for English words database 174 
(ANEW: Bradley & Lang, 1999) for all available words.  For both negative lists, valence 175 
was lower than the neutral lists and arousal was higher.  Between the negative lists, 176 
both valence and arousal were equal.  The recognition test contained 42 words.  These 177 
were made up of the ͸ critical lures, ͳͺ ǲoldǳ words, and ͳͺ ǲnewǳ words.  Old words 178 
were those from positions 1, 5, and 10 in each of the 6 presented lists, and new words 179 
consisted of 3 emotionally congruent non-presented low associates for each of the 180 
critical lures. 181 
Participants received a standard set of instructions at the start of the 182 
experiment, along with the first SAM questionnaire.  Comprehensive instructions were 183 
given with the first SAM to avoid confusion later in the task (subsequent SAM 184 
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questionnaires contained basic instructions).  Experimental groups watched one of the 185 
short video clips, and completed a SAM questionnaire afterwards.  All groups were then 186 
presented with the 6 DRM lists in auditory form, with words 2 seconds apart, and 3 187 
seconds between lists.  Following this the neutral video clip was presented, and again 188 participantsǯ filled out a SAM questionnaire.  They then began the recognition test. 189 
Standard instructions to indicate old and new words were given, as well as instructions 190 
to report if recognition of old words was based on a remember, know, or guess 191 
judgement (remember meaning they experienced a memory of the word, know meaning 192 
the word feels familiar but they do not have the explicit memory of it, and guess meaning 193 
they are just guessing that it was presented).  Finally, participants were asked to 194 
complete one more SAM questionnaire to ensure there were no lasting effects of the 195 
negative emotion induction. 196 
 197 
Results 198 
Emotion Manipulation 199 
Of the 83 participants, 8 were removed from the analysis as their arousal scores 200 
decreased following the emotion induction video and 3 were removed because their 201 
valence scores increased following the video.  Of the remaining participants 28 were in 202 
the control group, 21 in the fear group, and 23 in the anger group.  No significant 203 
differences were found between the groups for arousal, F(2, 69) = .51, p = .60, or 204 
valence, F(2, 69) = 2.93, p = .06, before the emotion manipulation.  However, following 205 
the emotion induction the difference between groups for arousal was significant, F(2, 206 
69) = 7.14, p < .01, as was the difference in valence, F(2, 69) = 16.47, p < .01.  Bonferroni 207 
pairwise-comparisons (alpha set at .05) indicated that arousal scores for the fear group 208 
(M = 5.85, SD = 1.62. 95% CI [5.12, 6.60]) and anger group (M = 5.30, SD = 1.64, 95% CI 209 
[4.60, 6.01]) were significantly higher than the control group (M = 4.21, SD = 1.26, 95% 210 
CI [3.73, 4.70]) following the emotion induction.  Valence scores were significantly lower 211 
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in the fear (M = 4.80, SD = 1.36, 95% CI [4.12, 5.43]) and anger group (M = 4.52, SD = 212 
0.67, 95% CI [4.23, 4.81]) compared to the control group (M = 6.39, SD = 1.52, 95% CI 213 
[5.80, 6.98]) following the emotion induction.  There were no differences in arousal or 214 
valence scores between the two negative emotion groups (p = .52 for arousal, and p = 1 215 
for valence).  Finally arousal and valence scores were compared between the groups 216 
following the neutral video, before the recognition test.  No significant differences were 217 
found between the groups in either arousal, F(2, 69) = 2.30, p = .35, or valence, F(2, 69) = 218 
1.33, p = .49.  Thus, participantǯs emotions differed only at encoding, and not at retrieval. 219 
Recognition Responses 220 
Proportion of recognition responses were coded for correct recognition of old 221 
words, false recognition of critical lures, and false recognition of filler words.  Separate 3 222 
(Emotion: fear vs. anger vs. control) x 3 (List: fear vs. anger vs. neutral) ANOVAs were 223 
conducted for overall recognition responses for each set of words, one each for 224 
remember responses, for know responses, and for guess responses.  Prior to analyzing 225 
data for all conditions, the responses for the control group were analyzed based on the 226 
order in which the lists were presented.  No significant differences were found for 227 
overall recognition, and remember judgements, for all correct recognition and false 228 
recognition of critical lures (p > .05 in all cases).  Thus, we concluded that the order of 229 
list presentation is not likely to have had an effect on performance on the memory task.  230 
False recognition of critical lures. Where critical lures were recognized as 231 
being present in the original lists, responses were first analyzed for false recognition, 232 
and then separately for whether the recognition was accompanied by remember, know, 233 
or guess responses.  For all false recognition of critical lures there was no significant 234 
main effect for Emotion, F(2, 69) = .40, p = .70,     = .01, but a significant main effect of 235 
List F(2, 138) = 10.00, p < .001,     = .13, and a significant interaction effect between List 236 
and Emotion  F(4, 138) = 3.83, p < .01,     = .10.  Pairwise comparisons (see Table 1 for 237 
means and standard errors) using the Bonferroni correction showed that within the fear 238 
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group the proportion of recognition of critical lures was significantly higher for fear lists 239 
compared to anger lists (p < .01) and neutral lists (p < .01) and there were no differences 240 
between the anger and neutral list (p = 1.00).  Within the anger group the proportion of 241 
false recognition was significantly higher for anger lists compared to neutral lists (p < 242 
.05) but no significant difference was found between the anger and fear lists (p = .62) or 243 
fear and neutral lists (p = .33).  Within the control group there were no significant 244 
differences between the lists (all pǯs > .ͲͷȌ. 245 
For Ǯrememberǯ false recognition responses (see Figure 1) there was a significant 246 
main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 3.61, p < .05,     = .10, but no significant effect of List, 247 
F(2, 138) = 2.63, p = .08,     = .04. However, there was a significant Emotion x List 248 
interaction, F(4, 138) = 12.45, p < .01,     = .27.  For the fear emotion group, pairwise 249 
comparisons revealed that the proportion of remember responses was significantly 250 
higher for fear lists than anger lists (p < .01) and neutral lists (p < .01), but the difference 251 
between the anger and neutral lists was not significant (p = .93).  For participants in the 252 
anger group, the proportion of false memories for anger lists was significantly greater 253 
than fear lists (p < .01) and neutral lists (p < .05) but the difference between the fear and 254 
neutral lists was not significant (p = .78).  For the control group there were no 255 
significant differences between the lists (all pǯs > .ͲͷȌ. 2 256 
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 257 
 258 
Figure 1. Proportion of false Ǯrememberǯ responses as a function of emotion group 259 
and list emotion (Error bars represent SE) *p < .05 260 
 261 
Participants additionally made know or guess responses to a selection of the 262 
falsely recognized critical lures, however the figures for these categories were very low, 263 
thus reducing the power for any subsequent analyses.  For the know judgements the 264 
main effect for List, F(2, 138) = 1.08, p = .34,     = .02, main effect for Emotion, F(2, 69) = 265 
1.3, p = .28,     = .04, and the List x Emotion interaction, F(2, 138) = 2.30, p = .06,     = .06, 266 
were all non-significant.  For guess judgements the main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 1.37, p 267 
= .26,     = .02, main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.10, p = .34,     = .03,  and the Emotion 268 
x List interaction, F(2, 69) = 1.25, p = .29,     = .04, were also non-significant. 269 
True recognition of list items. For true recognition responses there was a 270 
significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 5.63, p < .01,     = 0.07, no significant main 271 
effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 0.84, p = .44,     = 0.02, and a significant List x Emotion 272 
interaction, F(4, 138) = 3.75, p < .01,     = 0.1.  Pairwise comparisons (see Table 2 for 273 
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means and standard errors) within the fear group showed that recognition for fear lists 274 
was significantly higher than neutral lists (p < .05) but not anger lists (p = 1.00) and the 275 
difference between anger and neutral lists was non-significant (p = .25).  For the anger 276 
group the proportion of correct recognition responses was significantly higher for anger 277 
lists compared to fear lists (p < .01), but the difference between the anger and neutral 278 
lists was non-significant (p = .48) as was the difference between neutral and fear lists (p 279 
= .14).  In the control group there were no significant differences (all pǯs > .ͲͷȌ. 280 
For remember responses to correctly recognized items there was a significant 281 
main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 3.56, p < .05,     = 0.05, but not Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.02, p 282 
= .37,     = 0.03, and a significant List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 6.53, p < .05,     283 
= 0.16.  Pairwise comparisons for the fear group and control group revealed no 284 
significant differences between lists (all pǯs > .ͲͷȌ.  Within the anger group however the 285 
remember responses to anger lists were significantly greater than fear lists (p < .01), 286 
and responses for the fear lists were significantly greater than neutral lists (p < .05).  287 
The difference between the anger and neutral lists was not significant (p = .18). 288 
For know responses to correctly recognised list items there was a significant 289 
effect of List, F(2, 138) = 4.30, p < .05,     = 0.06, but not of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.46, p = 290 
.24,     = 0.04, or the List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 1.91, p = .11,     = 0.05.  291 
Within the fear group pairwise comparisons show that know responses for the fear lists 292 
were significantly higher than the neutral lists (p < .05).  No significant differences were 293 
found between the fear and anger lists (p = .78) and anger and neutral lists (p = .21).  294 
Within the anger group and control group there were no significant differences (all pǯs > 295 
.05).   296 
For guess responses there was no significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 0.35, 297 
p = .70,     = 0.01, no main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 0.13, p = .88,     = 0.00, or any List 298 
x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 1.93, p = .11,     = 0.05.  Within the fear group the 299 
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guess responses for anger lists were significantly higher than fear lists (p < .05) however 300 
no other differences were significant (all pǯs > .ͲͷȌ. 301 
False recognition of fillers. For recognition of filler items there was a 302 
significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 35.59, p < .01,     = 0.34, but not Emotion, F(2, 303 
69) = 0.08, p = .93,     = 0.00, or the List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 1.32, p = .27, 304     = 0.04.  Pairwise comparisons (see Table 3 for means and standard errors) within the 305 
fear group show that recognition for fear lists was significantly higher than anger lists (p 306 
< .01) and neutral lists (p < .01) but the difference between anger and neutral lists was 307 
not significant (p = .56).  For the anger group the proportion of recognition responses 308 
was significantly higher for fear lists compared to neutral lists (p < .01), but the 309 
difference between the anger and neutral lists was not significant (p = .06) nor was the 310 
difference between anger and fear lists (p = .11).  In the control group recognition was 311 
significantly higher for fear lists compared to anger lists (p < .01) and neutral lists (p < 312 
.01). The difference between the anger and neutral lists was not significant (p = 1.00).  313 
For remember responses there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 314 
4.17, p < .05,     = 0.06, but not Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.59, p = .21, η2 = 0.04, or the List x 315 
Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 0.91, p = .46,     = 0.03.  Pairwise comparisons revealed 316 
no significant differences (all pǯs > .ͲͷȌ. 317 
For know responses there was a significant effect of List, F(2, 138) = 23.02, p < 318 
.01,     = 0.25, but not Emotion, F(2, 69) = 0.98, p = .38,     = 0.03, or the List x Emotion 319 
interaction, F(4, 138) = 2.43, p = .07,     = 0.06.  Within the anger group the pairwise 320 
comparisons show no significant differences between lists (all pǯs > .ͲͷȌ. Within the fear 321 
group the know responses are significantly higher for fear lists compared to neutral (p < 322 
.01) and anger lists (p < .01).  The difference between the anger and neutral lists was not 323 
significant (p = 1.00).  Within the control group the responses to fear lists were 324 
significantly greater than responses to neutral lists (p < .05) but no other differences 325 
were significant (all pǯs > .ͲͷȌ. 326
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 For guess responses to filler items there was a significant effect of List, F(2, 138) 327 
= 7.91, p < .01,     = 0.10, but not Emotion, F(2, 69) = 2.98, p = .06,     = 0.08, and the List 328 
x Emotion interaction was significant, F(4, 138) = 2.68, p < .05,     = 0.07.  Within the fear 329 
and control group the pairwise comparisons show no significant differences between 330 
lists (all pǯs > .ͲͷȌ.  For the anger group the guess responses to anger lists were 331 
significantly greater than neutral lists (p < .05) and the responses to fear lists were 332 
significantly greater than neutral lists (p < .05).  The difference between the anger and 333 
fear lists was not significant (p = 1.00). 334 
 335 
Discussion 336 
The results presented here are the first to demonstrate the specificity of the 337 
emotion congruency effect with spontaneous false memories. Participants believed to be 338 
experiencing fear or anger falsely Ǯrememberedǯ significantly more critical lures from 339 
the lists for which the content was congruent to their emotional state.  Not only does this 340 
replicate previous findings of an emotion congruency effect driven by valence (Knott & 341 
Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 2009), but it extends these findings to reveal that the emotion 342 
congruency effect is present for discrete emotions, even when arousal and valence are 343 
similar across experimental conditions.   344 
This pattern of discrete emotion congruency is consistent with spreading 345 
activation theories, such as AAT (Howe et al., 2009) and Bowerǯs ȋͳͻͺͳȌ Network 346 
Theory of Affect, as well as other theories such as FTT (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002), and 347 
appraisal theories of emotion (see Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 2014).  According to AAT, we 348 
would be more likely to produce false memories related to the emotion we are 349 
experiencing due to the heightened activation of the related emotion node in the 350 
associative network, which contains both semantic and affective memory structures.  351 
Where past research has demonstrated this through activation of general negative 352 
emotion nodes, our results show that this associative network activation is much more 353 
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selective, activating discrete emotion nodes.  Our results similarly support FTT, which 354 
would posit that the emotional state of the participant at encoding would increase the 355 
likelihood of extracting emotion-congruent gist from congruent stimuli, and therefore 356 
increase the chances of false retrieval.   In addition to theories pertaining to false 357 
memory production, theories regarding emotion processing can also provide some 358 
explanation for the results found.     359 
Specific emotions, such as fear and anger, appear to have a distinctive effect on 360 
the way people attend to, encode, and retrieve information.  Emotions are believed to be 361 
adaptive mechanisms for survival.  They can increase the efficiency of reactions to 362 
events and optimise the response by biasing cognitive resources toward relevant stimuli 363 
in the environment (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 2014).  This 364 
biasing effect can subsequently increase activation of concepts, or gist strength.  365 
Although previous research has shown this to be the case in the memory accuracy 366 
literature, we have shown that this may be the case for false memory production too.  367 
As well as emotions being adaptive, Howe (2011) highlights the adaptive nature 368 
of false memories, and their role in survival and goal attainment.  Research has shown 369 
that memory is biased towards survival relevant conditions (Nairne, Thompson, & 370 
Pandeirada, 2007; Nairne, 2010).  It adapts to encode information that will be most 371 
beneficial to the present goals and future survival of the person.  The different 372 
appraisals and actions associated with different emotions therefore benefits from a 373 
memory system that is biased towards information most associated with that specific 374 
emotion and subsequently the desired goal.  With regards to fear and anger, although 375 
both emotions are often associated with similar situations, their adaptive purposes are 376 
very different.  Fear is considered to provoke avoidance behaviours, where an organism 377 
retreats from the stimulus, whereas anger would provoke an approach response, where 378 
the organism may attack the stimulus (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Elliot, 2006; 379 
Rutherford & Lindell, 2011).  Although there may be other dimensions on which fear 380 
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and anger differ, the approach/avoidance mechanism has clear adaptive value and could 381 
account for the findings of this experiment.  Although it is important to understand the 382 
role of arousal and valence when investigating the effects of emotion, our findings 383 
demonstrate the need to go beyond these dimensions to fully understand differences 384 
that discrete emotions may have on many cognitive mechanisms.  385 
Our results support the assumption that our emotion induction procedure was 386 
successful, however there are limitations in the method used.  Ethically, we could not 387 
induce the same emotional state experienced when being attacked, however, our chosen 388 
induction technique has been normed extensively for producing the desired discrete 389 
emotions (see Bartolini, 2011; Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg et al., 2007).  Our 390 
control condition was that of a no-induction condition, however past research differs in 391 
its use of a no-induction condition versus a neutral emotion induction.  Although there 392 
are advantages to controlling the emotional state of the control participants, our aim 393 
here was to compare the results of our negative emotion groups to a true control group.  394 
With regards to our emotion groups, when inducing anger it must also be noted that 395 
there is often a subsequent induction of disgust.  While this may be the case with our 396 
chosen film clip it would only be a mild induction and we do not feel it confounds our 397 
results.  In addition, due to the nature of the stimuli being used we were unable to 398 
employ a more comprehensive subjective measure of emotion.  The emotion words 399 
necessary for any such measure would have confounded the results of the memory test.  400 
Nevertheless, analysis of the SAM scales confirmed the appropriate changes in mood 401 
following the induction procedures, and the clips used are not known to induce the 402 
contrasting emotion.   403 
With regards to the DRM lists used we were careful to ensure that none of the 404 
words presented had high BAS for the critical lures on the incongruent emotion lists.  405 
However, given the nature of fear and anger there may be weak, indirect, associations 406 
across lists, whereby words on the anger lists may be associated with words on the fear 407 
Emotional congruency and false memories 18 
lists and vice versa.  With most typical DRM studies we would expect to see relatively 408 
low false recognition rates for filler items.  However, our filler items were congruent to 409 
each of the lists and therefore not strictly unrelated.  We therefore expect to see the 410 
same congruency effects, if much weaker, as we do with the critical lures.  According to 411 
AAT, very weak associates would not normally create a spreading of activation 412 
significant enough to produce false memories.  However, the congruent emotional 413 
experiences would have enhanced these activations, subsequently bringing many to the 414 
necessary threshold for false memory production.  415 
An alternative explanation for our pattern of results can be found in the 416 
response bias literature (REF: Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Windmann & Kutas, 2001).  417 
Dougal and Rotello (2007) demonstrated that when semantic densitiy was matched 418 
between negative, neutral, and positive stimuli there is no difference in sensitivity or 419 
memory accuracy between the three conditions.  They did however find a difference in 420 
response bias, whereby participants were more liberal in their recognition responses to 421 
negative stimuli compared to neutral and positive, regardless of whether the stimuli was 422 
old or new.  This finding suggests that negative stimuli generally elicits higher 423 
proportions of responding, and may therefore cause one to question whether an 424 
increased response to negative emotional stimuli is in fact due to a congruent emotion 425 
induction or simply an increased bias.  However, this prediction can only account for a 426 
general increase for negative stimuli.  In our experimental manipulation we have two 427 
different negative emotions, each with similar levels of valence and arousal, and any 428 
increase in recognition rates for negative stimuli within each of our groups is specific to 429 
the congruent emotion. 430 
The results of this research have implications for clinical settings in which 431 
therapists may discuss emotional memories with patients, or therapies aimed at 432 
encouraging new positive memories.  Research has shown how important specific 433 
emotional states may be in false memory.  For example, Howe and Malone (2011) 434 
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showed that the presence of major depressive disorder significantly increased false 435 
memory production for depression relevant information.  Although caution is 436 
appropriate when generalizing from psychopathology to everyday emotional 437 
experiences, the current study expands on this finding to show that this highly specific 438 
emotion congruency effect is also present outside of the clinical disorder.  Those not 439 
diagnosed with major depressive disorder are still at risk of producing false memories 440 
congruent to the specific negative mood that they experience at encoding. 441 
Although further research is required to gain a more complete understanding of 442 
the effect of emotion on memory, our results demonstrate that even with a mild 443 
laboratory induced emotion false memories for specific emotion-congruent events will 444 
lead to an increase in susceptibility and a high production of false memories (see also, 445 
Howe et al., 2010; Knott & Thorley, 2013).  Although research has shown that arousal 446 
and valence have distinct effects on memory production, this study is the first to show 447 
that when emotions are similar on both of these dimensions a discrete emotion 448 
congruency effect can occur. Future research should endeavor to establish the 449 
underlying mechanisms responsible for this effect. 450 
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Appendix 541 
 542 
Stimuli: DRM word lists 543 
 Neutral 
 
Anger 
 
Fear 
Critical 
Lure 
Earth Hair 
 
War Anger 
 
Fear Danger 
 
planet strand 
 
battle mad 
 
terror risk 
 
world scalp 
 
bomb frustrate 
 
fright caution 
 
globe lice 
 
fight hate 
 
anxiety warning 
 
ground conditioner 
 
revolution rage 
 
afraid safe 
 
gravity comb 
 
nuclear temper 
 
panic daring 
 
environment headband 
 
missile fury 
 
scared trouble 
 
worm dandruff 
 
soldier ire 
 
horror zone 
 
heaven mousse 
 
gun wrath 
 
monster fire 
 
sphere bald 
 
destruction fight 
 
scream accident 
 
geology clippers 
 
defeat hatred 
 
darkness harmful 
 544 
BAS for presented words has been checked across list categories. All values are 545 negligible with the exception of ǲscreamǳ (found in the fear list), which has a BAS of .02 546 
with anger.  In addition, fear and anger have BAS of .01 and .02. 547 
 548 
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Footnotes 550 
 1  Independent samples t-tests were conducted for all true and false recognition 551 responses, as well as for Ǯrememberǯ responses, within the control group, to look at the 552 
different list orders used.  No significant differences in recognition responses to list 553 
words were found between participants who received the anger lists first and those who 554 
received the fear lists first, all pǯs > .1.  555 
 2 Signal detection analyses (d’ and C) did not reveal any patterns that differed 556 
from those of the main analysis.  These analyses were calculated two different ways: 557 
First using fillers unrelated to the lists but matching in emotional content and second 558 
using only the neutral unrelated fillers. 559 
 560 
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Table 1: False recognition responses to critical lures as a function of emotion and list  562 
  Fear Group  Anger Group  Control Group 
    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
Overall Recognition               
 Fear lists .93 .04 .85 1.01  .63 .07 .48 .78  .77 .06 .64 .89 
 Anger lists .57 .08 .42 .77  .78 .07 .62 .90  .61 .07 .46 .75 
 Neutral lists .53 .09 .34 .71  .48 .08 .31 .64  .61 .06 .47 .74 
Remember                
 Fear lists .74 .07 .58 .89  .09 .05 -.02 .19  .36 .07 .21 .51 
 Anger lists .17 .07 .02 .32  .39 .05 .28 .50  .39 .08 .23 .55 
 Neutral lists .29 .08 .12 .46  .20 .07 .05 .34  .36 .06 .23 .48 
Know                
 Fear lists .12 .05 .02 .22  .30 .06 .18 .43  .25 .05 .14 .36 
 Anger lists .21 .07 .08 .35  .24 .07 .10 .38  .09 .04 .01 .16 
 Neutral lists .12 .05 .02 .22  .15 .07 .01 .29  .21 .05 .12 .31 
Guess                
 Fear lists .07 .04 -.01 .15  .24 .08 .08 .40  .16 .05 .05 .27 
 Anger lists .19 .08 .02 .36  .15 .06 .03 .27  .13 .04 .04 .21 
 Neutral lists .12 .06 .00 .24  .13 .05 .03 .23  .04 .02 -.02 .09 
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Table 2: Recognition responses to target items as a function of emotion and list  563 
  Fear Group  Anger Group  Control Group 
    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
Overall Recognition               
 Fear lists .60 .05 .50 .70  .38 .04 .30 .45  .56 .05 .46 .65 
 Anger lists .57 .05 .45 .68  .66 .06 .51 .76  .61 .05 .51 .70 
 Neutral lists .42 .06 .30 .54  .50 .05 .40 .61  .52 .04 .44 .60 
Remember                
 Fear lists .44 .05 .33 .56  .14 .03 .08 .20  .36 .05 .25 .47 
 Anger lists .37 .06 .24 .49  .49 .04 .39 .58  .38 .05 .28 .47 
 Neutral lists .33 .06 .21 .46  .33 .05 .24 .43  .35 .03 .28 .42 
Know                
 Fear lists .13 .03 .06 .19  .15 .04 .08 .23  .12 .03 .06 .18 
 Anger lists .09 .02 .04 .14  .10 .03 .04 .17  .18 .04 .11 .26 
 Neutral lists .03 .01 .00 .06  .10 .02 .06 .14  .09 .03 .03 .15 
Guess                
 Fear lists .03 .01 .00 .06  .09 .03 .03 .14  .08 .02 .03 .13 
 Anger lists .11 .04 .03 .19  .07 .02 .03 .11  .05 .02 .01 .09 
 Neutral lists .06 .02 .01 .11  .07 .02 .03 .11  .08 .02 .04 .11 
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Table 3: Recognition responses to filler items as a function of emotion and list  564 
  Fear Group  Anger Group  Control Group 
    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
Overall Recognition               
 Fear lists .34 .06 .22 .46  .28 .05 .21 .40  .36 .06 .25 .48 
 Anger lists .15 .04 .05 .23  .20 .05 .10 .29  .11 .03 .06 .17 
 Neutral lists .07 .03 .01 .14  .05 .03 .01 .12  .12 .03 .05 .20 
Remember                
 Fear lists .08 .02 .03 .13  .07 .02 .02 .11  .11 .03 .04 .18 
 Anger lists .09 .04 .01 .16  .01 .01 -.01 .04  .04 .01 .01 .07 
 Neutral lists .04 .03 -.01 .09  .02 .02 -.02 .07  .04 .02 .01 .08 
Know                
 Fear lists .18 .04 .10 .27  .08 .03 .02 .14  .14 .04 .06 .21 
 Anger lists .02 .01 -.01 .04  .04 .02 .01 .08  .04 .02 .01 .08 
 Neutral lists .01 .01 -.01 .02  .01 .01 -.01 .04  .04 .02 .01 .08 
Guess                
 Fear lists .08 .02 .03 .13  .13 .03 .07 .19  .11 .03 .05 .17 
 Anger lists .04 .02 .01 .07  .15 .05 .06 .25  .03 .01 .00 .06 
 Neutral lists .02 .02 -.01 .06  .02 .01 .00 .05  .04 .02 .00 .08 
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